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INTRODUCTION

n recent years, many states have enacted voluntary remediation, or "brownfields," statutes to expedite hazardous waste
cleanups, and restore dormant and underutilized lands to productive use. Voluntary remediation statutes have become increasingly popular due to the unintended effects of certain federal
environmental statutes, particularly the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act' ("CERCLA"
or "Superfund"). In response to the public-health hazards posed
by properties contaminated with toxic wastes, Congress enacted
CERCLA in 1980, intending to force "polluters" to pay for
remediating hazardous waste sites. Although Superfund was designed to be the most expedient method of cleaning such sites,
the "polluter pays" principle has in fact hindered remediation efforts due to protracted and costly litigation over who actually
must fund the removal of contamination. 2 One reason for this
morass of lawsuits is CERCLA's broad definition of "potentially responsible party" 3 which encompasses almost every entity having a re* University of Richmond, J.D. Class of 1997; State University of
New York at Buffalo, 1992, M.A., 1994; B.A., cum laude, honors in philosophy, 1992, University of Pittsburgh. The author would like to thank Professor Joel B. Eisen for his continued guidance in writing this article,
and the members of the Fordham Environmental Law Journal for their
ever-helpful comments and insights.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
2. See Douglas A. McWilliams, EnvironmentalJustice and Industrial
Redevelopment: Economics and Equality in Urban Revitalization, 21 ECOLOGY

L.Q. 705, 726-32 (1994).
3. Under CERCLA, a potentially responsible party includes
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, (2) any
person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of, (3) any person who by con-
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lationship to a Superfund site.
In addition to slowing cleanup efforts for many sites, the farreaching CERCLA liability provisions have put a chill on the sale
and development of now-dormant industrial and commercial
properties, 5 known as "brownfields. '' 6 Owners will often take their
properties off of the market rather than risk the discovery of toxic
wastes on their land. 7 Moreover, potential developers of such
properties avoid brownfields so as not to become "owners" or "operators" of a CERCLA site. 8 As a result of this skittishness towards
brownfields, developers (and the corresponding economic benefits
they bring) have been continually migrating out of urban centers
towards relatively pristine suburban and exurban lands commonly
termed "greenfields."9 Continuing greenfield development not only

tract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another
party or entity and containing such hazardous substances,
and (4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous
substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from
which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes
the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance.
42 U.S.C. § 9607.
4. See Julia A. Solo, Comment, Urban Decay and the Role of
Superfund: Legal Barriers to Redevelopment and Prospects for Change, 43
BUFF. L. REV. 285, 286 (1995).
5. See id.
6. See Stacie A. Craddock, Comment, A Call for Public Participation
in State Voluntary Remediation Programs: Strategies for Promoting Public Involvement Opportunities in Virginia, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 499, 503 n.17
(1996). See generally Joel B. Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams: Challenges and
Limits of Voluntary Cleanup Programs and Incentives, 96 U. ILL. L. REV. 883

(1996). "A 'brownfield' is best defined as 'abandoned or underutilized
urban land and/or infrastructure where expansion or redevelopment is
complicated, in part, because of known or potential environmental
contamination.' " Id. at 890 (quoting NAT'L ENVTL. POL'Y INST., How
CLEAN IS CLEAN?: WHITE PAPER ON BROWNFIELDS 38 (1995).
7. See Craddock, supra note 6, at 505.
8. See Solo, supra note 4, at 286-87.
9. See id. at 287.
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introduces potentially polluting activities into otherwise clean areas, 10 but guides job growth away from city centers." In addition, it
can cause incidental environmental degradation from increased
commuter traffic, due to a lack of mass transit options for greenfield employees.'"
In an attempt to stem the tide of greenfield despoliation and revitalize urban areas, an increasing number of states are implementing
so-called voluntary remediation statutes.' 3 These statutes may very
well be the key to urban renewal and environmental restoration.
The central aim of these legislative schemes is to encourage individuals to voluntarily remove contamination from brownfields by eliminating many of the Superfund-related obstacles that have previously
plagued such properties.14 Nevertheless, such statutory schemes
often fail to provide any meaningful community input into the
remediation process, and this Note proposes the use of the local
zoning and planning power as a means of effectively including communities in brownfield cleanups.
Voluntary remediation statutes typically have three main components to encourage brownfield development. First, such brownfields
legislation usually contains provisions creating a range of cleanup
standards; by contrast, CERCLA mandates a "one-size-fits-all"
cleanup standard requiring that the property be made suitable for
residential use no matter the actual use of the property. 15 Each
cleanup standard mandates that remediated property not be harmful to human health.' 6 By allowing for varying degrees of remediation to meet this baseline requirement, as opposed to mandating
cleanup to pre-pollution levels regardless of actual .risk, developers

10. See id. at 304.
11. See id. at 303.
12. See id. at 304-05.
13. See Craddock, supra note 6, at 499 n.3.
14. See id. at 499-500. These obstacles include exorbitant costs, the
degree and method of cleanup that CERCLA requires, and the extensive liability "net" that CERCLA casts. This combination of factors discourages cleanups. Brownfield statutes try to ameliorate these problems
by providing for more flexible standards in the means and extent of
remediation.
15. See Eisen, supra note 6, at 910; see also McWilliams, supra note
2, at 738-40.
16. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1429.1(A)(1) (Michie 1996).
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of brownfields receive greater flexibility, and decreased costs, in putting brownfields back on the market.1 7 Second, brownfields statutes
invariably offer some degree of liability protection for brownfields
owners once the applicable cleanup standard is met,18 thus removing one of the greatest disincentives to purchasing, selling, or developing contaminated property. The varying types of liability releases
lend a degree of predictability to the remediation process, allowing
developers to proceed with cleanup efforts without fear of being
subjected to CERCLA liability at a later date.1 9 Finally, voluntary
remediation legislation often contains provisions allowing for public
participation in the remediation process, ostensibly allowing some
degree of community input and self-determination as to the
20
remediation efforts and future use of the brownfield in question.
Public participation is probably the most contentious issue surrounding brownfields legislation 21 because a fundamental tension
underlies the concept of voluntary remediation: Does streamlining
the hazardous waste remediation process take place at the expense
of public health and welfare?22 Developers may often perceive increased public participation as a time-consuming, costly imposition
on speedy remediation. 23 Conversely, unless they are given a voice,
communities surrounding brownfields may feel that they are the
targets of environmental injustice, 24 especially where the state has
approved relaxed cleanup standards for brownfields located in

17. See McWilliams, supra note 2, at 738-41.
18. See, e.g., Steven E Fairlie, The New Greenfields Legislation: A Practitioner's Guide to Recycling Old Industrial Sites, 5 DIcK.

J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y

77, 79 (1996) (discussing liability limitation provisions of Pennsylvania's
voluntary remediation statute).
19. See McWilliams, supra note 2, at 742-48.
20. See R. Michael Sweeney, Brownfields Restoration and Voluntary
Cleanup Legislation, 2 ENVTL. LAW., 101, 160 (1995).

21. See McWilliams, supra note 2, at 773-74.
22. See id. at 738.

23. See Sweeney, supra note 20, at 160.
24. See, e.g., BUNYON BRYANT & PAUL MOHAI, RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS: A TIME FOR DISCOURSE (1992). See
also Vicki Been, Analyzing Evidence of EnvironmentalJustice, 11 J. LAND
USE & ENvTL. L. 1 (1995) (questioning the import of putative evidence
of environmental racism).
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25
predominantly minority or low-income areas.
Voluntary remediation statutes themselves reflect this tension, as
public participation provisions range from California's mandate to
take community concerns into consideration, 26 to Ohio's total exclusion of the public (and virtually the state as well) from the remediation process. 27 Given the states' varying approaches to public participation,28 two fundamental questions must be resolved. First, if the
community is indeed shut out of the decision-making process, is
there any means by which it can effectively block an undesirable
project. Second, if the public is to be included in the remediation
of brownfields, what is the most effective method to do so?
In answering these questions, the author turns to an area of law
that both legislators and commentators appear to have overlooked:
the local zoning and planning power. Part I of this Note analyzes
voluntary remediation statutes, and how comprehensive planning
and zoning issues arise in the implementation of such statutes. Part
II discusses the public's role in zoning actions, and the communities' ability to use the municipal zoning power as it currently exists
as a potential means of participating in brownfields remediation.
Such participation includes, for example, taking part in the decision-making process in local government hearings and legislative
proceedings for actions affecting re-use of brownfields. Part III proposes the creation of "Brownfields Zoning Designations", as a
means by which the zoning power, and consequently the public,
can be more fully, and effectively, integrated into brownfield redevelopment and decision-making efforts.

25. See McWilliams, supra note 2, at 767.
26. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25398.6(i)-(j) (West 1996).
27. Under Ohio's system, verification of a developer's compliance
with an applicable cleanup standard may be left solely to a "certified
professional." See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.11(A) (Banks-Baldwin
1996). If the certified professional determines that the applicable
cleanup standard has been met, he or she has the authority to issue a
"no-further-action letter" as a liability release. See id. The developer
need only contact the state if he or she wishes to receive a "covenant
not to sue" from the state. See id. § 3746.12. See also 415 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/58.7(h) (West 1996) (leaving community participation to
developer's discretion).
28. For a comprehensive listing of state public participation requirements, see Eisen, supra note 6, at 976 n.394.
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ZONING AND PLANNING ISSUES IN CURRENT VOLUNTARY
REMEDIATION LEGISLATION

The redevelopment of brownfields inherently entails land-use
issues. First, from a comprehensive planning perspective, putting
abandoned or underutilized property back into productive use
invariably affects the nature of the surrounding community. It alters traffic patterns and density, increases noise, and changes the
balance of uses in a particular area, e.g., creating more industrial
and commercial sites in a community that had been previously
29
predominantly residential.
Second, a participant in a voluntary remediation program may
envision a use of the property that is in conflict with current
zoning ordinances. 30 To proceed with the planned redevelop3
ment, therefore, the developer must seek a zoning amendment '
or variance 32 for the property.

29. See McWilliams, supra note 2, at 723, 758.
30. See Solo, supra note 4, at 309.
31. See DONALD G. HAGMAN & JULIAN C. JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN
PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAw § 6.2, at 164-72 (2d ed.

1986). These authors have found that
[a]mendments are made by ordinance by the legislative body
of the local government. Proper subjects for amendment
may be either procedural or substantive provisions of the ordinance. Substantive amendments include: (1) rezonings, or

zoning map amendments, that is, a change of the zone that
applies to a parcel of land; (2) zoning text amendments, that
is, a change in use permitted within a given zone. The
amendment can be initiated by either the legislative body, a
government official or a property owner.
Id. at 164; see also CHARLES M. HAAR & MICHAEL ALLEN WOLF, LAND-USE
PLANNING: A CASEBOOK ON THE USE, MISUSE AND RE-uSE OF URBAN LAND
313-43 (4th ed. 1989) (discussing zoning amendments).
32. See HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 31, § 6.5, at 172-82.
They believe that
[variances] are intended to alleviate a situation in which for
no public reason, zoning for an area more stringently burdens one parcel of land than others .... Variances are generally of two kinds: bulk or area variances which include
those granted for height and minor departures from the ordinance, and use variances, which usually involve more substantial changes. The typical enabling act does not separately

authorize two different kinds of variances, though some stat-
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Third, zoning may be used as an "institutional control."3 3 Institutional controls require restrictions on the future use of a particular site in order to reduce potential exposure to contamination; these restrictions are often instrumental in allowing a
developer to meet applicable cleanup standards.3 4 In addition,
years after a site has been remediated, a local governmental entity must prevent any change in the use of that property if that
change would endanger the public without further
remediation.35
Fourth, the cleanup standard applicable to a particular site is
often a function of the use permitted on the property.3 6 A site
slated for residential development will generally entail greater
and more numerous exposure pathways than will an industrial
site. 37 Hence, a more stringent cleanup standard is necessary for
the former than the latter, to reduce the public's potential exposure to hazardous contaminants.38
Finally, redeveloping property may affect land-use-based environmental controls, such as stormwater discharge reduction3 9 or

utes, ordinances and courts do not allow use variances, particularly for large sized parcels . .

.

.A variance is proper

only if there is: 1) no adverse effect on [the] public, 2) no
adverse effect on neighbors, and 3) the property has unique
characteristics which make it eligible for a variance.
Id. at 172-74 (citations omitted); see also HAAR & WOLF, supra note 31, at
343-62 (discussing variances and special exceptions to zoning
ordinances).
33. See generally Susan C. Borinsky, The Use of Institutional Controls in
Superfund and Similar State Laws, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL. LJ. 1, 1 (1995) (noting that "institutional controls include use restrictions and requirements of notices in deeds or leases, notices in property transfer documents, building permits, easements, well-drilling prohibitions, and
zoning ordinances").
34. See id. at 1-2.
35. See id. at 7.

36. See Sweeney, supra note 20, at 159-60.
37. See Krista J. Ayers, Comment, The PotentialFor Future Use Analysis in Superfund Remediation Programs,44 EMORY L.J. 1503, 1513-15 (1995).
38. See id.

39. For example, Virginia's Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act, VA.
10.1-2100-.1-2116 (Michie 1995), utilizes a land-use based
system to control pollution runoff into the Chesapeake Bay. See also
CODE ANN. §§
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transportation conformity.4 0 If the reuse of a brownfield involves
creating impermeable surfaces, or results in employees commuting from outlying areas, these redevelopment efforts may result
in a violation of state and/or federal law.
While brownfields redevelopment implicates land-use, land-use
in turn implicates community input. Whenever a change is contemplated for a master plan,4 1 or for the zoning of a particular
parcel, notice to, and public comment by, the affected commu43
nity is mandated. 42 Since the seminal Euclid decision of 1926,
municipalities have been afforded great deference in making
land-use decisions for the health, safety, and general welfare of
the public. 44 The zoning function is perhaps one of local governments' most significant powers, and is one of the primary vehicles for community self-determination, allowing a municipality to
45
control the type and extent of development within its borders.

Chesapeake Bay Critical Areas Program, MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. §§ 81801-1816 (1995). See generally Joel B. Eisen, Toward A Sustainable Urbanism: Lessons From Federal Regulation of Urban Stormwater Runoff 48 WASH.
U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 1 (1995).
40. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7 4 01- 7 6 7 1 q (1994). The Clean
Air Act mandates that states control traffic patterns and vehicle use in
order to reduce airborne pollution. Id. § 751 la. See generally D. Brennen Keene, Transportation Conformity and Land-Use Planning: Understanding the Inconsistencies, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 1135 (1996) (discussing the relation between land-use and transportation conformity).
41. "The plan serves as an overall set of goals, objectives, and policies to guide land-use decisionmaking by the local legislative body."
HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 31, § 2.9, at 24. See generally Ch arles M. Haar, The Master Plan: An Impermanent Constitution, 20
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 353 (1955).
42. See, e.g., Cross v. Billett, 221 P.2d 923 (Colo. 1950) (noting ordinance's requirement of public notice and hearing for zoning actions)
(cited in HAAR & WOLF, supra note 31, at 1071).
43. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
44. See id. at 387 (noting that zoning ordinances "must find their
justification in some aspect of the police power, asserted for the general welfare").
45. See HAAR & WOLF, supra note 31, at 599-700 (discussing regulation of the "[t]empo and [s]equence of [g]rowth."). There are, of
course, limits to the power municipalities have in maintaining their
"character." Efforts to prevent the influx of new residents may raise
"exclusionary zoning" concerns. See id. at 371-504 (discussing various
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The intersection of land-use and brownfields legislation, therefore, affords some degree of public participation even if a particular state's voluntary remediation program fails to provide for
any meaningful community input.
For a number of reasons, a community may seek inclusion in
the decision-making process for a particular brownfield. First,
nearby residents of a contaminated site may be wary of new industrial activity in the area, and may want reassurance that the
proposed development will not yet again expose the public to
hazardous wastes.4 6 This issue is most likely to surface where the
community is concerned about a cleanup standard that allows
more contamination to remain on the site than the rigid CERCLA standard would permit.4 7 Besides reassurance, neighborhood
residents may want to call attention to certain attributes of the
property in question that may affect the remediation process. 8
For example, if children frequently use the property as a shortcut to or from school, the risk of exposure to various contaminants may increase, dictating either a more stringent cleanup
standard 49 or the use of some type of institutional control such as
warning signs and fencing.50 Local residents may also want to provide information to "fine tune" a development plan, requesting, for
instance, that trees be planted on one side of the project to act as
sound buffers, or that parking lot entrances be placed to reduce

exclusionary effects of zoning); see also Patrick J. Skelley II, Note, Defending the Frontier (Again): Rural Communities, Leap-Frog Development, and
Reverse Exclusionary Zoning, 16 VA. ENVTL. LJ. 273 (1996) (discussing

methods by which rural localities can zone to prevent displacement of
low-income residents by uncontrolled development). For a detailed account of the historic Mount Laurel exclusionary zoning cases, see
CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE SPACE AND AUDACIOUS
JUDGES (1996).

46. See McWilliams, supra note 2, at 708-10.
47. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text (discussing voluntary remediation statutes' cleanup standards).
48. See Craddock, supra note 6, at 509.
49. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (discussing future
use analysis in setting cleanup standards).
50. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text (discussing institutional controls).
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traffic flow on residential streets frequented by children." Above all,
the public will simply want to be informed about remediation activi52
ties in their locality.
Failure to include the neighborhood at an early stage in the planning and remediation process is likely to cause resentment and misapprehension among the local population, which could ultimately
result in the failure of an otherwise meritorious redevelopment effort. 3 Indeed, environmental justice advocates will inevitably take a
dim view of reinstituting industrial and commercial activities in
predominantly low-income and minority neighborhoods, especially
54
where the cleanup will not reach CERCLA's "pristine" standards.
In such a situation there will undoubtedly be a feeling of "being
dumped on twice"; first, when the original pollution occurred, and
second, when new potentially hazardous activities are encouraged
on land that is not "fully" remediated. By shutting the door on the
public, participants in voluntary remediation programs will almost
55
assuredly be facing widespread community outcry.
If a state's voluntary remediation statute fails to provide for adequate public participation, the local zoning process may provide the
only avenue for the community's involvement in a particular project. Aside from being a source of information, the zoning decisionmaking process may serve as a vehicle by which the public can force
either the state environmental agency, the developer, or both, to
consider neighborhood concerns. Moreover, if the parties to the
voluntary remediation fail to consider pertinent community
desires, 56 neighborhood activists may very well utilize the local zoning function to delay, if not eliminate, redevelopment efforts. This
opportunity, however, will only arise in certain circumstances.

51. See generally PETER CALTHORPE, THE NEXT AMERICAN METROPOLIS:
ECOLOGY, COMMUNITY, AND THE AMERICAN DREAM (1993) (advocating
"walkable" streets to favor pedestrian traffic over vehicular traffic).
52. See McWilliams, supra note 2, at 774.'
53. See Eisen, supra note 6, at 1031 (arguing that "without statutory
amendments to address [public participation concerns], even meritorious projects will be stymied by local resistance"); McWilliams, supra
note 2, at 708-10.
54. See McWilliams, supra note 2, at 764.
55. See id. at 708-10.
56. See id. at 775.
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COMMUNITY USE OF THE ZONING POWER TO CONTROL
BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT

A.

Capitalizing on Departures From the Zoning Ordinance

The most obvious chance for a community to determine the
fate of a voluntary remediation proposal occurs when the current
use classification of a site conflicts with the developer's more intensive proposed use of the parcel.5 7 In such a situation, the developer must seek a rezoning5 8 or use variance5 9 for the property
from the appropriate local governmental entity. To make the requisite change, a municipality must hold a hearing on the matter,
thus providing an opportunity for the community to influence
the ultimate decision. 60 At such a proceeding, community members can voice their opinions concerning the proposed use. If
the developer inadequately responds to the public's concerns, local residents (particularly where environmental justice issues are
raised) may exert enough pressure to either persuade the local
government to refuse the developer's request, or force the devel6
oper to abandon the project for fear of negative media fallout. '
The downfall of relying upon rezoning or variance hearings as
a forum for public input is that community resistance will likely
focus most upon proposed industrial, and to a lesser extent,
commercial, uses. 62 Most contaminated brownfield sites, however,
are likely to be abandoned commercial or industrial sites, and
hence will already be zoned for such activities. 63 In addition, if
the property is, for example, an industrial zone and in a jurisdiction that recognizes cumulative zoning, a proposed less intensive
use such as commercial or residential will already be permitted. 64

57. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 31 (discussing zoning amendments).
59. See supra note 32 (discussing zoning variances).
60. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (discussing notice
and hearing requirements for zoning changes).
61. See McWilliams, supra note 2, at 708-10. See generally BRYANT &
MoHAI, supra note 24.
62. See Craddock, supra note 6, at 509.
63. See Sweeney, supra note 20, at 109.
64. See HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 31, § 3.3, at 46 ("[In
cumulative zoning] only the "highest" zone is exclusive, and that [is]
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In either case, no zoning change will be necessary to redevelop
the site; and, consequently, the public will not be able to challenge the projects that it may find most objectionable.
Local residents, however, may still be able to use another aspect of the general zoning power to control brownfields redevelopment in their community: the elimination of non-conforming
uses ("NCUs").65 In many "mixed-use" neighborhoods where development proceeded unchecked prior to the enactment of a
comprehensive zoning scheme, industrial and commercial activities often existed amidst residences at the time the zoning
scheme was first put in place. For example, a junkyard or a gas
station might be located in the middle of residential dwellings.
When a system of zoning laws was eventually enacted, these more
intensive uses often conflicted with the zoning classifications. Despite this conflict, such uses were permitted to remain as NCUs
to avoid unreasonable abridgment of individuals' property rights.
Nevertheless, since such uses no longer fit with the character of
the area envisioned by the local zoning entity, a number of techniques were, and are still, used to prevent the continuing exis66
tence of NCUs.
One such technique is the termination of NCUs upon abandonment of the use.67 Abandonment occurs when the property

the residential zone. Residential uses [are] permitted in commercial
zones and all uses [are] permitted in industrial zones."). In exclusive
industrial zones, however, uses other than industrial are not permitted,
hence a plan to develop commercial or residential properties in such a
zone would conflict with the existing zoning. See id. at 80-81 (discussing
exclusive commercial and industrial zones). But see Katobimar Realty
Co. v. Webster, 118 A.2d 824 (1955) (invalidating exclusion of commercial uses from exclusive industrial zones on ground that no sufficient
distinction existed between such uses).
65. See HAAR & WOLF, supra note 31, at 290-312 (discussing NCUs,
"[p]reexisting [u]ses [t]hat [w]on't [Wlade [a]way").
66. See generally HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 31, at 117-29
(discussing termination of NCUs). Other techniques of NCU termination and control include prohibiting expansion or alteration of the
NCU, preventing a destroyed NCU from being rebuilt, amortization of
the NCU, and immediate termination of the NCU based on nuisance
principles. See id.
67. See id. at 120-21 (discussing abandonment of NCUs).
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owner no longer uses the property in a non-conforming manner,
e.g., the gas station in a residential district goes out of business and
ceases operations. In many cases, after a reasonable time elapses,
the NCU is lost, and the property can no longer be used in a nonconforming manner.68 Thus, for example, the owner of the defunct
gas station will be barred from making the gas station operable
again. In the context of brownfields redevelopment, community residents can assert that when a developer proposes to reuse a particular site in a manner that no longer accords with current zoning ordinances, such a use would constitute an improper reinstatement of
a prior NCU, and thus should not be permitted. Such an approach
could, of course, force a developer either to radically change her
plans for the property, or else dissuade a potential remediator from
taking further action. In addition, the termination of the NCU in
effect results in a "downzoning" 69 of the subject property, since the
more intensive use-previously permitted as a NCU-is now barred.
This power would essentially give the community a veto over the
property in question: Once the NCU is terminated, the local zoning
entity must first approve any future plans for reinstatement of the
NCU (or a more intensive use).T0
If, in derogation of the public's wishes, the municipality approves
a rezoning to a more intensive use or refuses to acknowledge the
termination of an NCU for a brownfield targeted for an objectionable project, the public is still not without recourse. However, it has
an even more significant burden. Once the zoning entity's action
71
has become final, the community can appeal the decision.

68. See id.
69. Community residents could, of course, call for downzoning a
parcel upon learning of a proposed remediation. Nevertheless, if such
a rezoning is undertaken as a purely reactive measure, a local government may be hesitant to acquiesce to the public's demand for fear of
interfering with a developer's "vested" rights and being sued for committing "reverse spot zoning." See id. at 136-41 (discussing spot zoning).
70. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. Providing the
community with input into the process at this late stage would be particularly applicable in enforcing a land-use-based institutional control.
71. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-496.1 (Michie 1996) (providing

mechanism for appeal).
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Overcoming Standing and the Standard of Review in Zoning
Appeals

The first hurdle that a community must clear in appealing a
zoning decision is the issue of standing to sue. In most jurisdic7
tions, only "aggrieved" parties have the legal right to bring suit.
The only persons typically fitting this description are the owner
7 3
of the property at issue, and owners of contiguous parcels.
Where a community-at-large opposes the redevelopment of a particular parcel, therefore, it may be difficult to find a proper party
to challenge the board's actions.
This problem may be further exacerbated if the subject property is in a cluster of commercial or industrial sites, because the
owners of contiguous commercial or industrial properties may either not want to interfere with redevelopment that could increase their own economic well-being, or may fear similar community backlash to their own activities. Nevertheless, the
brownfield projects that are most likely to generate significant
74
opposition are those in which residences border the brownfield.
Individuals living in such residences, therefore, will almost undoubtedly have standing.
A further obstacle exists in non-home-rule jurisdictions. 75 In
such states, a municipal corporation has only those powers expressly granted to it by the state. 76 A developer, therefole, may

72. See, e.g., id.; see also Craddock, supra note 6, at 528-29 (noting
that only "aggrieved" persons have standing).
73. See Cupp v. Board of Supervisors and Fairfax County, 318
S.E.2d 407, 411-12 (Va. 1984) (stating that "aggrieved" parties in zoning
disputes must have a "personal stake" in the outcome of a case, but
that the owner of affected property always has a "personal stake").
74. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
75. In home rule jurisdictions, localities may enact and enforce local laws such as zoning ordinances. Therefore, any such ordinances are
a legitimate exercise of municipal authority. See HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER,

supra note 31, § 3.8, at 53-54. In non-home-rule jurisdictions,

however, Dillon's Rule severely limits the exercise of local government
power and may prevent the implementation of any innovative land-use
measures. See W. Todd Benson & Philip 0. Garland, Legal Issues Affecting Local Governments in Implementing the Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act,
24 U. RICH. L. REv. 1, 5 n.26 (1989) (citations omitted).
76. For example, one decision stated

19971

BROWNFIELD REMEDIATION

attack a locality's attempt to zone in regard to brownfields on
the basis that such an exercise of power was not contemplated by
the state, and is thus ultra vires and improper. The best advice
for a locality, though, would be to proceed with its zoning measures, couching its actions as being within the contemplation of
its general police power.
Assuming, arguendo, that a proper plaintiff can be found, the
community must, on appeal, overcome the high degree of deference afforded to zoning decisions. Under the Euclidean' system
of zoning, a court will uphold a local government's decision so
long as the reasoning underlying the decision is "fairly debatable. ' 77 Any indicia of reasonableness will render the municipality's decision unassailable, thus-leaving the community without
relief.
C.

Effective Community Use of Zoning

Despite this multitude of obstacles, a community may nevertheless mount a multi-pronged attack on the zoning decision. In
the situation when the local government rezones a brownfield to
a more intensive use, the plaintiffs can first argue that the decision is arbitrary and capricious, 78 and contend that allowing the
voluntary remediation to continue constitutes a threat to public

[n]othing is better settled than that a municipal corporation
does not possesses and cannot exercise any other than the
following powers: (1) those granted in express words; (2)
those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; (3) those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation, not simply convenient
but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable doubt as to the existence of power is resolved by the courts against its existence
in the corporation, and therefore denied.
Kline v. City of Harrisburg, 68 A.2d 182, 184-85 (Pa. 1949) (striking
down "interim" zoning ordinance as ultra vires and invalid).
77. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388
(1926) ("If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to
control.").
78. See Administrative Process Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-6.14:1 6.14:25 (Michie 1996) (setting out standards of review for administrative actions).
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health, safety and welfare. The community can also charge that
the rezoning is not in accordance with a so-called "comprehensive plan. ' 79 If it can be established that the proposed use of the
property conflicts with the existing master plan8 0 and the general
character of the neighborhood, the municipality's decision could
be reversed. Similarly, depending on the jurisdiction, rezoning
may only be proper if there has been a change in physical circumstances of the area surrounding the brownfield, or there was
a mistake in the original zoning.8 1 Plaintiffs, therefore, could argue that neither a change nor a mistake existed to warrant the
rezoning. Finally, the community could try to have the zoning
decision classified as a "quasi-judicial," rather than a legislative
proceeding, since the zoning change affected only a single parcel
of property.82 As quasi-judicial, the decision would receive a lesser
degree of deference than a legislative action, thus making it easier to overturn. 3

79. "[C]onsistency refers to the relationship between a comprehensive plan and its implementing measures. Not only does this mean
that the plan and regulations promulgated under it must be consistent,
it also means, in a growing number of jurisdictions, that any development orders and permits must be consistent with the local plan."
HAGMAN & JUERGENSME'ER, supra note 31, § 2.13, at 32. The courts' interpretation of "comprehensiveness" has been far from consistent. See
HAAR & WOLF, supra note 31, at 555-66 (noting the courts' disparate
treatment of consistency). For the seminal discussion of zoning in ac-

cordance with a comprehensive plan, see Charles M. Haar, In Accordance
With a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REv. 1154 (1955).
80. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (defining "master

plan").
81. See HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 31, § 6.4, at 169-72
(discussing the "change-or-mistake" rule).
82. "[The] determination whether the permissible use of a specific
piece of property should be changed [is] an exercise of judicial authority, subject to a [more stringent] test." Id. at 170 (citing Fasano v. Board
of County Commissioners, 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973) (holding that quasijudicial nature of rezoning shifts burden to person seeking a rezoning
to show why change is necessary). See also Coniston Corp. v. Village of
Hoffman Estates, 844 E2d 461, 468-69 (7th. Cir. 1988) (discussing dif-

ferences between legislative and adjudicative actions).
83. See HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 31, at 170.
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If, on the other hand, the municipality refuses to terminate the
NCU for the property, the public could simply use reformulations
of the arguments stated above. For example, it could challenge the
failure to prevent the proposed project on the ground that allowing
the industrial or commercial classification to remain constitutes a
threat to the public, and hence is an arbitrary or capricious exercise
of power.

4

Next, community residents could assert that, given the community's
general character, the proposed use is not in accordance with a
comprehensive plan. Finally, the public could again argue that the
local government's inaction was quasi-judicial in nature, thus pre85
cluding deferential review of the decision.
In reality, a community would not likely be particularly successful
in challenging a municipality's decisions by taking the courses of action just described. As it stands now, however, the community may
have few other options if it wishes to engage in any meaningful dialogue concerning the fate of a certain brownfield. In addition, by
utilizing such an approach, if a community finds a proposed voluntary remediation to be objectionable, it may be successful in killing
a project altogether, by making the particular site less attractive
than other properties available to the developer as a result of the
time, expense, and negative public relations surrounding the chal86
lenged project.

84. See supra note 78 (citing statutory standards of review for administrative actions).
85. See supra note 82-83. At a different level, the community could
conceivably contend that allowing redevelopment of a brownfield runs
afoul of some land-use-based environmental law, such as stormwater
runoff control, or the transportation conformity provisions of the
Clean Air Act. See supra notes 39-40. The burden in bringing such a
suit, however, is probably even more onerous than that involved in
challenging a zoning decision, particularly where the standing issue is
concerned. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975) (requiring plaintiffs to show "specific concrete facts" of alleged harm).
86. Use of the local zoning power to open up the brownfields
remediation process to the public is somewhat analogous to citizens'
use of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d
(1995), to force various governmental and private entities to "stop and
think" about the impacts of their proposed actions; this provides time
to garner further public opposition to, and input into, the proposed
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Considering the potential ability to effectively preclude the
remediation and subsequent remediation of a brownfield, one lingering question remains: Is the community better or worse off if the
property remains undeveloped? The site that was the subject of the
dispute still remains unused, unprofitable, and worse yet, contaminated. 87 The public has perhaps fended off a potentially detrimental
project, but has also prevented the possibility of new jobs, tax revenues, and public improvements. 8 8 While the zoning power can be
used to give the public the ability to veto, it is perhaps more advantageous to all parties involved in voluntary remediation efforts to
give the public a voice.
III.

ZONING AS THE PUBLIC PARTICIPATION MECHANISM FOR
VOLUNTARY REMEDIATION LEGISLATION

Abandoned, contaminated properties are invariably a detriment to their communities due to aesthetic blight, lost employment opportunities, and above all, health risks. Any hope of
comprehensive urban economic redevelopment and revitalization, therefore, hinges on eliminating pollution from
brownfields, and returning such sites to productive use as expeditiously as possible. Nevertheless, even the most well-intentioned
projects run the risk of being vehemently opposed, and quite
possibly destroyed, by the public. This may be particularly true if
individuals perceive (or more likely misperceive) that state agencies are engaged in "backroom" deals with developers, thus allowing industries to "repollute" affected communities.8 9 Public

project. See WILLIAM H.

RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 842 (1994). In

addition, failure to include the public in the remediation process may
constitute arbitrary or capricious action under the "hard-look" doctrine
advanced in the Overton Park decision. See id. at 91-95 (discussing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). But
see id. at 95-98 (discussing cases advocating "soft-glance" deferential review of agency action).
87. See McWilliams, supra note 2, at 709-10.
88. See id.
89. See Eisen, supra note 6, at 1021 ("A board such as Ohio's Property Revitalization Board appears to be a potential 'regulatory
backroom' for cutting deals that shifts risk to the excluded community,
because it does not require any representation from affected
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participation at the earliest stages of remediation planning is
thus instrumental in fostering the speedy, effective cleanup of
brownfields. 90 However, many voluntary remediation statutes lack
any provisions to include public input concerning a developer's
plans for a particular site. 91
A.

Creating a Joint Effort for Brownfields Redevelopment

One remedy for inadequate public participation procedures
could be simply to rewrite brownfields statutes at the state level
to provide for increased community involvement. This approach,
however, is problematic for several reasons. First, legislative
change is time consuming and costly, and considerable debate
would likely ensue over exactly how to provide for public participation. 92 Moreover, since many state legislatures have recently
passed voluntary remediation statutes they will probably not be
amenable to making substantial amendments to recently enacted
laws. Considering that the voices in opposition to increased public participation still exist, gridlock would be the likely result of
such legislative efforts. 93 In addition, in the current era of
streamlined government services, requiring state agencies to
shoulder the burden of conducting meetings between communities and developers, or having to sort out a flood of written public comments, would tax already overstressed state resources. 94 Fi-

communities.")
90. See McWilliams, supra note 2, at 711.
91. See supra note 27.
92. The vastly different approaches to public participation taken
by the states indicate that still no consensus exists as to how to provide
for community involvement in brownfields remediation. See Eisen, supra
note 6, at 972-76.
93. See, e.g., Sweeney, supra note 20, at 160 (noting that public notice requirements may be a "deterrent" to undertaking voluntary cleanups unless projects are given proper "spin"); see also Eisen, supra note
6, at 1020-21 (discussing "capture" of state regulatory bodies by industrial interests).
94. See, e.g., Jim Keary & Laura M. Litvan, Casinos in PG Rake in
Millions, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1992, at Al (noting that in 1992 the Maryland Department of Environmental Resources had its staff cut by 40
percent and received no budget increase); Lynn Sprentall, DNR Finds
Developer Violated Dunes Act, TRIB. Bus. WKLY., June 10, 1992, at 1 (noting
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nally, even with the input of various communities, state
environmental agencies are simply not designed to take into account all of the local and regional effects of approving a
brownfields remediation proposal.
Rather than place the fate of communities in the hands of
state government alone, a more practical solution might be to
create a joint effort between state agencies and local governments. Several state environmental laws already utilize some type
of state-local partnership; 95 and, given the overlap between
brownfields legislation and land-use law explicated above, 96 such
a system might be particularly expedient in the brownfields context. Even if the state fails to make any significant strides in the
way of increasing public participation, localities can most likely
make such provisions on their own initiative. 97 The question now
stands as to how to integrate land-use and zoning law with voluntary remediation legislation.
B.

Putting the Community and Remediators "in the zone"

As we have already seen, the only time the local zoning power
is invoked is when a more intensive classification for a particular
site is contemplated, 98 or a non-conforming use is at issue. To en-

major staff and budget cuts at the Michigan Department of Natural Resources); Rex Springston, DEQ Deputy Stresses Openness; New No. 2 Runs
Daily Operations, RICH. TIMEs-DISPATCH, Feb. 19, 1996, at B1 (noting report's finding of low morale and staff cuts in Virginia's Department of
Environmental Quality).
95. See, e.g., Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act, VA. CODE ANN.

§§ 10.1-2100-.1-2116 (Michie 1996). See also Patrick J. Skelley II, Note,
Finding the Pearl in the Oyster: Strategies for a More Effective Implementation
of Virginia's Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act, 31 U. RiCH. L. REv. (forth-

coming 1997) (discussing means of strengthening state and local partnership to improve Chesapeake Bay water quality).
96. See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text.

97. In several states with "negotiated compensation" statutes for
waste disposal facility siting, see Eisen, supra note 6, at 991-97 (discuss-

ing negotiated compensation statutes), communities are precluded
from enacting local laws to block such projects. See id. at 993. Such pro-

visions have not, however, found their way into voluntary remediation
statutes.
98. See supra notes 30-32.
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sure that a zoning change, and hence community input accompanies every remediation effort, municipalities could create a
new set of zoning classifications applicable to each brownfield.
Local zoning entities or planning commissions could identify
potential brownfields based on inactivity and prior use. All
properties that could be the subject of future remediation activities would retain their original height, bulk, and use classifications. 99 Such properties however, could be given the additional
designation of "Brownfield-Inactive." When a developer seeks to
remediate a contaminated site, he or she will be precluded from
taking any action toward the property until the zoning is
changed to "Brownfield-Active." 10 0 Enacting such a land-use
scheme will have numerous beneficial effects in terms of public
participation.
First, notice of a pending project often may be sufficient to
quell an angry community response, or at least diminish residents' ire.10 1 With sufficient notice, neighborhood residents will
have some advance warning of remediation and redevelopment
activities, as opposed to being taken by surprise one day when
bulldozers and other equipment suddenly appear on the lot next
door. 10 2 If nearby residents are blindsided by the unannounced
reuse of contaminated property, community opposition and
truculence concerning the project is almost inevitable.10 3 Most
states require that municipalities provide notice of pending rezoning to owners of lands abutting the subject property, and that
such notice is circulated in some type of printed medium, usually a local newspaper.10 4 An affected community, therefore, will
be alerted to a potential remediation project, notwithstanding
any lack of a public notice provision in a particular state's
brownfields statute.
Besides notice, a zoning hearing for each targeted site' 0 5 pro-

99. See HAAR & WOLF, supra note 31, at 220-55 (discussing bulk,
height, and use ordinances).
100. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
101. See McWilliams, supra note 2, at 782-83.
102. See id. at 708-10.
103. See id.
104. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-431 (Michie 1989).
105. See, e.g., id.
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vides an open forum conducive to a full and free exchange of information between the potential developer and the affected community. Such a forum gives residents of an affected area a sense
of community participation. Furthermore, as a result of the dialogue between community and contractor, the public can learn
the property's intended use, and what impacts the remediation
and redevelopment of the site will have on the surrounding
neighborhood and region. Neighborhood residents should also
be able to find out what contaminants are on the property, how
such pollution will be removed or contained, and to what extent
the site will be cleaned.
Conversely, the developer can glean particular concerns of the
community, and attempt to assuage the public's fears. 10 6 For example, the developer could ascertain how neighborhood residents comport with the site. Information regarding whether individuals walk across any portion of the property would be vital
to a developer in terms of instituting any type of institutional
controls 0 7 on the site, as well as determining an applicable
cleanup standard. 0 8 In addition, if the public informs a developer of a particularly heavy traffic flow on. any street bordering
the site, such knowledge may greatly aid the siting of ingress,
egress, parking facilities, and loading areas for the proposed development. 10 9 The developer may also gather information to mitigate non-toxic pollution such as noise, odors, vibrations, and
glare, to prevent possible nuisance suits"0 in the future. More
importantly, perhaps, depending at what stage the zoning hearing takes place, public input may provide the developer with information concerning the past uses of a particular parcel, thus
aiding a developer's "Phase I" site investigation."' Finally, the de-

106. See McWilliams, supra note 2, at 773.
107. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
110. See HAAR & WOLF, supra note 31, at 91-151 (discussing
nuisance).
111. See James W. Creenan & Joh-A Q. Lewis, Comment, Pennsylvania's Land Recycling Program: Solving the Brownfields Problem With

Remediation Standards and Limited Liability, 34 DuQ. L. REv. 661, 687-90
(1996).
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veloper can use the zoning hearing to assure the public that the
new use will not expose the surrounding community to further
health risks, explaining that any new activity on the property
must comply with current state and federal environmental laws
probably not in effect when the original polluting activities were
taking place."'
C.

The Local Role

There is, of course, a third party involved in the rezoning proceedings: the local governmental entity that must determine
whether the brownfield should be rezoned "active." By their nature, local zoning entities are quite able to resolve disputes between landowners concerning potentially discordant uses of
property. These governmental bodies are presumably equipped
to determine not only whether a property owner's use of land is
appropriate in reference to neighboring uses, but whether such
a use accords with regional needs and concerns, given a zoning
entity's familiarity with master plans and other comprehensive
planning techniques. Under the Euclid standard, zoning is to be
carried out to best promote the public health, safety, and general welfare.113 This standard is readily applicable-with one limitation discussed below-to zoning actions involving brownfields.
By presiding over the dialogue between the public and the
participant in the voluntary remediation program, a municipal
government should be able to evaluate the merit of the public's
various concerns, and to determine whether the developer will
adequately accommodate community residents' reasonable re-

112. This is not to say that every new industry will be 100% risk
free. See Eisen, supra note 6, at 1025 (" [D] evelopers are not guaranteeing that they will not cause pollution in the future."). Nevertheless, any
proposed use of the site will have to comply with any number of state
or federal environmental laws such as the Clean Air Act, §§ 42 U.S.C.
74 01-7 6 7lq (1994) (limiting airborne pollution), the Clean Water Act,
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994) (limiting waterborne pollution), and the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, §§ 42 U.S.C. 6901-6992k
(1994) (preventing the storage or disposal of hazardous wastes upon an
unauthorized site).
113. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394-95
(1926).
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quests.1 1 4 Besides the effect on the brownfield's immediate neighbors, a municipal zoning entity can assess the impact on the surrounding region and consistency with the master plan." 5 Viewed
in this light, a local government's analysis and determination of a
brownfield rezoning request is not terribly different than the garden-variety zoning cases it sees on a regular basis, as it exercises
its police powers to control brownfields redevelopment within its
borders. There is, however, one aspect of voluntary remediation
that is probably beyond the authority of local governments:
cleanup standards.
D.

Which Watchdog Watches What?

One of the most appealing features of voluntary remediation
statutes is the elimination of CERCLA's draconian "one-size-fitsall" cleanup standards. In place of a uniform standard, maximum contaminant levels are often set according to "Risk Based
Corrective Actions" (RBCA) that consider the type of the contaminant, the medium in which the contaminant exists, and the
attendant health risks. 11 6 Many systems, for example, employ a
three-tiered RBCA system to govern cleanups.11 7 The first tier incorporates a "background" standard.1 8 In the second tier are
"statewide health standards" which set risk-based uniform stan-

114. One wonders, however, if municipalities could simply deny a
rezoning based on a community's unreasonable requests. See, e.g.,
Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 467 (7th
Cir. 1988) (" [N]othing is more common in zoning disputes than selfish
opposition to zoning changes. The Constitution does not forbid government to yield to such opposition; it does not outlaw the characteristic operations of democratic . . . government, operations which are permeated by pressure from special interests.") (citation omitted).
115. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-489 (Michie 1989) (explaining
the purposes of zoning ordinances).
116. See Eisen, supra note 6, at 947-1038; Robert W. Wells, Jr., Without "Rebecca," Cost-Effective Environmental Cleanup Is An Oxymoron At Florida's Petroleum Contamination Sites, FLA. B.j., Feb., 1996, at 53.

117. See Eisen, supra note 6, at 946-48 (discussing "tiered" cleanup
standards).
118. See id. at 903. This standard is reminiscent of the CERCLA

mandate to remediate all sites to residential standards regardless of the
proposed use for the site.
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dards for various contaminants. The third tier, which is both the
most attractive cleanup standard available to developers, and the
most troubling, is the "site-specific" standard. 119 Site-specific
cleanups, as their name implies, are not governed by any preexisting standard as to maximum allowable contaminant levels;
rather, they employ a RBCA analysis for each individual site. The
site-specific RBCA decision-making process, in short, entails tailoring a cleanup standard to the particular characteristics of a
site by evaluating, inter alia, the proposed use of the site, 120 the
corresponding exposure and migration pathways of contaminants,1 2 1 and the type of pollution 2 2 and its attendant health
risks. 123 In establishing a site specific RBCA cleanup standard,
one must additionally evaluate a range of scientific data including, for example, toxicity studies 124 and geographic surveys 125 for
the subject site. After compiling and assessing this notinsignificant amount of information, an acceptable cleanup standard for the subject property is consequently set by the entity
126
charged with such a duty.
State environmental agencies are currently primarily responsible for evaluating proposed RBCA cleanup standards and either
approving or rejecting those proposals. 27 Given the state's resources, in terms of experts who are trained to assess scientific
data related to hazardous waste, it is probably best to leave
cleanup standards in the state's domain. Local governments, on
the other hand, are perhaps best equipped to assess the impact
of the development of a brownfield itself within its borders. It is
unlikely, however, that municipalities will be capable of making
an informed decision as to the prudence of a site-specific

119. See, e.g., 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6026.304 (1996).
120. See, e.g., id. § 6026.304(f)(1).
121. See, e.g., id. § 6026.304(1)(1)(iv).
122. See, e.g., id. § 6026.304(1) (1) (ii).
123. See, e.g., id. § 6026.304(1) (2).
124. See, e.g., id. § 6026.304(j) (2).
125. See, e.g., id. § 6026.304(d)-(e).
126. Under Pennsylvania's system, the participant in the voluntary
remediation program sets the site-specific standard in accordance with
strictures of § 6026.304, and submits for state approval various reports
and evaluations. See id. § 6026.304(1).
127. See, e.g., id. § 6026.304.
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cleanup standard proposed by a participant in a voluntary
128
remediation program.
As we have seen, cleanup standards are likely to be the most
hotly contested issue surrounding a proposed brownfield
remediation. 129 At a brownfields rezoning hearing, therefore, a
local zoning board could be faced with two equally unattractive
scenarios. In the first conceivable situation, the municipality
would be faced with "dueling experts," in which the developer
presents testimony asserting that the proposed cleanup standard
is more than adequate to protect human health and the environment, while the community offers conflicting evidence in an attempt to show that more extensive remediation is necessary to
shield the public from further harm. In the second, and more
likely, scenario, the developer will again proffer evidence in support of its proposed cleanup standard, while neighborhood residents, who cannot afford to hire an expert, will simply vociferously contend that they deserve a more stringent CERCLA-type
standard.
In either case, the zoning entity, lacking any expertise as to
RBCA-proposal evaluation, will be faced with an unenviable dilemma. It can approve the developer's proposal, which could ultimately result in public harm if the cleanup standard is inadequate. Alternatively, it can deny the developer's rezoning request,
and kill a redevelopment effort that could have been both overprotective of the community's welfare and a tremendous economic boon to the area.130 To avoid these potentially disastrous

128. See Michael Allan Wolf, Fruits of the "ImpenetrableJungle": Navigating the Boundary Between Land-Use Planning and Environmental Law, 50
WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 5, 78-85 (discussing local government's

inability to effectively enforce environmental controls). But see HAAR &
WOLF, supra note 31, at 743-61 (discussing the role of local governments in implementing environmental controls).
129. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
130. Whether redevelopment of a particular brownfield will actually result in the economic betterment of the surrounding community
is certainly subject to debate. See McWilliams, supra note 2, at 723-24. If,
in fact, the proposed use will employ persons from outlying areas who
commute to the site, local residents will not only fail to reap the economic gains from the redevelopment, but may be exposed to further
health risks as a result of the increased traffic. See id. at 758. The issue
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outcomes, the decision concerning approval or disapproval of an
applicable cleanup standard for a site should be left to the state
agencies,'3 1 leaving the question as to the propriety of the redevelopment itself to the local governmental body.'32 As part of its

of whether brownfields redevelopment will actually result in economic
benefits for local residents brings to mind certain Enterprise Zone legislation that requires businesses to hire a certain percentage of local residents in order to qualify for Enterprise Zone benefits. See Michael Allan Wolf, Potential Legal Pitfalls Facing State and Local Enterprise Zones, 8
URB. L. & POL'Y 77, 84-85 (1986) (discussing Enterprise Zone hiring

preferences). See also Patrick J. Skelley II, Comment, Enterprise Zones in
the Courts: Legal Challenges to State Economic Development Legislation, 30 U.

RICH. L. REv. 877, 891-93 (1996) (discussing cases involving job creation
in Enterprise Zones). Indeed, given the high number of brownfields in
economically distressed areas, there may be a significant overlap of voluntary remediation systems and Enterprise Zone (or Federal Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Community) designations.
131. Admittedly, leaving cleanup standards to the state perhaps
hampers public participation into the one element of voluntary
remediation that is most important to community residents. Nevertheless, the argument can still be made that public participation concerning cleanup standards can at least take place via state rulemaking procedures for setting maximum contaminant levels. The rebuttal to this
claim, however, is (1) that such decision-making processes are too far
removed from local concerns to raise any particular opposition from
any one community; (2) notice of such procedures may be easily overlooked; (3) the time and expense involved in traveling to the state capital to participate in public meetings may be too burdensome for many
urban dwellers; and (4) site-specific cleanup standards, which are probably the most contentious, may be set without any involvement at all.
In any event, the solutions offered in this Note are perhaps second-best measures, designed to include the public in a decision-making
procedure from which they may have been wholly excluded otherwise.
In addition, while community residents may not have a direct say in
setting cleanup procedures, they can voice their concerns at the zoning
hearings, and by so doing, perhaps prevent an otherwise improvident
remediation.
132. Given the extent of the public's involvement in the local zoning process, and the degree to which brownfields impact upon surrounding properties, one should not rule out the possibility that the
entire voluntary remediation scheme could be handled from a local
governmental perspective, utilizing only minimal state input. While further exploration of such a system is certainly warranted, it is beyond
the scope of this Note.
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decision-making process, however, the municipality should still require that the developer provide documentation of compliance with
the cleanup standard in order to fulfill its mandate to zone for the
1 33
benefit of the public weal.
E.

Timing is Everything

To fully integrate the state and local components of
brownfields remediation, the state approval of the proposed
cleanup standard should take place as early as possible. While
many state statutes require documentation of a planned remedia-

133. There is also the problem of assuring continued compliance
after the rezoning takes place. Naturally, one could charge the local
zoning entity with the task of preventing inconsistent future uses of
brownfields; however, this method is not without its pitfalls, given the
possibility that future zoning entities will either misunderstand the
brownfield zoning scheme, or capriciously rezone properties subject to
the brownfields zoning classification. See Borinsky, supra note 33, at 7
(discussing problems of enforcing institutional controls). One means of
supplementing the local government role is community activism,
whereby community groups can keep tabs on remediated brownfields,
and can alert municipal officials as to the nature of the property if a
change in the use is contemplated at a later date. Nevertheless, this assumes that neighborhood residents have the time and resources to
keep track of all "active" brownfields in the area, and to contest objectionable proposed alterations to those sites if a local government is derelict in its duties. One possible scheme that could be used in addition
to, or even in lieu of, the "Brownfield" zoning classification is a
"brownfield easement". When a potential developer seeks rezoning of a
particular parcel, she could be given the opportunity to voluntarily
place an equitable servitude on the property, akin to a conservation
easement. See HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 31, § 15.9 at 498-99,
§ 19.10 at 587. The brownfield easement is attractive for several reasons. First, such a restriction would allow the developer to retain all interests in the site, but would prevent any use inconsistent with the restriction, i.e., a more intensive use, or a renovation that would disturb
previously encapsulated toxic soil. In addition, even if the zoning is
changed, the easement will remain unaffected by this change. See id. at
587. Finally, local residents and neighborhood groups can be given the
power to sue without any concerns as to standing, provided that they
are either mentioned in the servitude, or are part of a neighborhood
organization considered to be acting on behalf of property owners surrounding the restricted property. See id. at 578-79.
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tion and proposed cleanup standard at the outset of the state approval process, others do not. Considering the. fact that a
cleanup could very well be stopped cold if a developer's planned
use for a site does not comport with sound planning and zoning
practices, states should require submission of, and approve or
deny, a proposed cleanup plan at the beginning, not the end, of
the review period. This not only facilitates speedy remediation,
but adds an element of legitimacy to the state's approval process
that may be lacking if state agencies merely rubberstamp
13 4
remediation plans at a late stage of the actual cleanup.
A state's early approval of a cleanup standard has the additional effect of allowing rezoning to occur as early in the process
as possible.135 Early zoning is advantageous for a number of reasons. First, the developer's proposed use might not be suitable
for the location, and it would be patently unfair for her to sacrifice the time and expense of navigating through a state's approval process, only to be halted by a local government just
before undertaking the remediation. Furthermore, permitting a
developer to expend significant resources on a project, allowing
him to claim a violation of his vested rights, 136 and hence facilitating an end run around the rezoning procedures if the project
is not approved by the local government would be equally unfair.
Most importantly, fostering a meaningful dialogue between developers and affected communities from the outset will prove to be
advantageous to all parties by greatly reducing the chance of a
showdown at the late stages of a brownfields cleanup. 37

134. See Eisen, supra note 6, at 1002 ("The legitimacy of a voluntary cleanup program depends to a great extent on whether the program provides the community [with] a voice").
135. See McWilliams, supra note 2, at 783.
136. See id. at 774; supra note 69.
137. There is, of course, the very real and persistent problem of
neighborhood concerns being trumped by powerful local political influences. See HAAR & WOLF, supra note 31, at 74-76. The author of
course does not mean to suggest that local governments are inherently
corrupt, but that municipalities are in the unenviable position of being
caught between community desires and the almost irresistible pressures
of local development concerns. See Eisen, supra note 6, at 1020 (noting
factors influencing state regulators).
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By taking into account public concerns early on, a developer
can avoid costly challenges to his or her project that could have
been warded off merely by making some minor and insubstantial
changes to the project from the outset. Conversely, by having
early access to information concerning a remediation effort, a
community can make informed decisions about a project, reducing the chance of scotching a cleanup on account of fear and
misperception concerning an otherwise highly beneficial project.
In any case, both the public and participants in voluntary
remediation programs have much to gain, and little to lose, by
being partners in brownfields redevelopment.

CONCLUSION

The problems created by hazardous waste contamination perhaps stem from a lack of foresight on the part of industrial and
commercial interests of years past. Failing to consider the longterm effects of one's actions often results in unpleasant, if not
disastrous, consequences. There is probably no better evidence
of this than the harm caused by both the existence of unremediated brownfields, and the laws that, until now, have prevented their renaissance. With this state of affairs in mind, an admonishment is perhaps in order.
Burgeoning voluntary remediation programs may very well be
the key to making brownfields "green" again; however, failing to
make the community a partner in the process will almost certainly result in consequences that will once again cause us in
hindsight to question the propriety of our actions. While permitting a developer to proceed without community input may be
more cost-effective in the short run, nuisance suits, toxic tort
claims, and the roadblocks that a community may erect to redevelopment attempts, may all exact a large price.
Similarly, a community's foregone job opportunities, tax revenues, infrastructure improvements, and the continued exposure
to environmental toxins, will factor into the long-term costs of
preventing a brownfield's remediation from proceeding as a result of misapprehension and misunderstanding. The only way,
therefore, to prevent our short-term triumphs from becoming
our long-term travesties, is to bring voluntary remediation program participants and the public together as coworkers in the
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task of putting brownfields back on the market. By utilizing the
already-existing zoning infrastructure to bring the community
into the remediation process, such a task may be made a great
deal easier.

